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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jimmy D. Leytham appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by denying
his request for depositions and by summarily dismissing one of the claims in his petition.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 43225, Mr. Leytham pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and
the district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years determinate.
(R., docket no. 43225 & 43226, p.77.)1 In docket number 43226, Mr. Leytham pleaded
guilty to criminal possession of a financial transaction card and the district court
imposed a sentence of five years indeterminate to be served consecutively to the
sentence in docket number 43225.

(R., docket no. 43225 & 43226, p.352.)

Mr. Leytham did not appeal from his judgments of conviction.

He did, however,

subsequently file Rule 35 motions for reduction of sentence in both cases. (R., docket
no. 43225 & 43226, pp.85, 360.) The denial of those motions was affirmed on appeal.
See State v. Leytham, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 360 (Ct. App. 2016).
On February 25, 2015, Mr. Leytham filed a petition for post-conviction relief from
the forgery charge. (R., p.4.) He asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
conduct a proper pre-trial investigation, failing to discuss trial strategy, and failing to
communicate with him. (R., pp.5-6.)

A motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of the transcripts, record, and
PSI in State v. Leytham is being filed contemporaneously with this Appellant’s Brief.
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Mr. Leytham elaborated on his claims in an affidavit. (R., p.15.) He asserted that
he placed more than 20 calls to his attorney but they were never returned. (R., pp.1516.) He stated that he asked his attorney for a binding Rule 11 agreement but was told
that the judge would not allow it. (R., p.16.) Mr. Leytham averred that he asked his
counsel to recuse the district court judge, but he refused. (R., p.16.) Counsel told him
that he and the judge were good friends. (R., p.16.)
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not contact him before a court
appearance, and that counsel’s law partner, who did not know about his case, appeared
at that hearing. (R., p.16.) When Mr. Leytham finally did speak to his attorney, he was
told that counsel had worked out a “great deal” and that if he pleaded guilty he would
get probation. (R., p.17.) At the entry of plea hearing, Mr. Leytham was told to say that
there were no promises. (R., p.17.) At sentencing, Mr. Leytham received a sentence of
ten years, with five years fixed. (R., p.17.)
Mr. Leytham filed a motion requesting the ability to depose his trial counsel
regarding his claims, which the district court denied, stating that it believed that
Mr. Leytham was engaging in a “fishing expedition.” (R., pp.44, 55.)
With the assistance of counsel, Mr. Leytham filed a second affidavit. (R., p.59.)
In this affidavit, Mr. Leytham asserted that he had hired Brian Neville as his attorney,
but on the day he pleaded guilty, Brian Blender, who worked with Mr. Neville, appeared
to represent him. (R., p.59.) Mr. Leytham did not know that Mr. Blender would be
appearing that day and only had a 7-10 minute discussion with him prior to pleading
guilty. (R., p.59.) Mr. Blender and Mr. Leytham did not discuss restitution that day.
(R., p.60.)

2

Mr. Leytham was taking numerous medications at the time of his plea; these
medications impacted his ability to understand the proceedings and he initially informed
the court that the medications made him more susceptible to suggestions from
Mr. Blender. (R., p.60.) Mr. Leytham did not fill out the entire written guilty plea himself.
(R., p.60.)
Mr. Leytham asserted that he told Mr. Neville about his medical conditions, but
Mr. Neville did not obtain any medical records for purposes of sentencing. (R., p.60.)
Further, Mr. Leytham believed that restitution was $202.75 because that was the
amount in the PSI; at the sentencing hearing, counsel agreed to $55,331.92 without
asking Mr. Leytham if he agreed to that amount. (R., p.60.)
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not show him the PSI and an
evaluation by Dr. Arnold until the day of sentencing and he was unable to read those
documents himself because of a medical condition. (R., p.60.) His attorney only read
the recommendations of the PSI to him and advised him not to say anything when he
had the opportunity to address the court at sentencing. (R., p.60.) Finally, Mr. Leytham
asserted that his attorneys never spoke to him about the right to appeal his sentence
and no appeal was filed. (R., p.60.)
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, which the district court granted.
(R., pp.86, 99.) Mr. Leytham appealed. (R., p.130.) He asserts that the district court
erred by denying his motion to conduct depositions and by summarily dismissing his
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately advise him prior to entry of
his plea.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Leytham’s motion to conduct
depositions?

2.

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Leytham’s petition for postconviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Leytham’s Request To Conduct Depositions
The decision to authorize discovery in a post-conviction case “is a matter
directed to the discretion of the trial court.” Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148
(Ct. App. 2006); see also I.C.R. 57(b) (“The provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure shall not apply to [post-conviction] proceedings unless and only to the
extent ordered by the trial court.”). A trial court is not required to order discovery in a
post-conviction action unless it is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights.
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375 (Ct. App. 1992). A court
is not required to permit a petitioner to engage in “fishing expedition” discovery because
a post-conviction action “provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to
research for grievances.” Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148.
Mr. Leytham’s motion specifically lists the three claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel: the failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation, the failure to
discuss strategy prior to the entry of the plea and the failure to effectively communicate.
(R., p.47.) Post-conviction counsel asserted that “Mr. Leytham’s claims require further
investigation in order to determine what factual basis exists for them. Mr. Leytham’s
present counsel needs to ask questions related to his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in order to provide the required evidence to earn an evidentiary hearing . . .”
(R., p.46.)

Post-conviction counsel also asserted, “a deposition is the only pre-

evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly developing Petitioner’s claims. Unlike
affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions provide both parties a full opportunity
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to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct.” (R., p.44.) The
district court denied the motion, holding that Mr. Leytham was going on a fishing
expedition and had made no showing that depositions were necessary.
Because Mr. Leytham made factual assertions in his affidavit and requested only
to depose trial counsel regarding his specific claims, he asserts that his motion was not
a generalized search for grievances but a request to question trial counsel regarding his
already alleged grievances.

Further, his post-conviction attorney asserted that he

needed to ask questions of trial counsel to develop the claims and that affidavits were
insufficient to fully reconstruct the circumstances of trial counsel’s challenged conduct.
The motion requested that trial counsel be deposed concerning the three allegations in
the petition, it was not a general fishing expedition. Further, Mr. Leytham elaborated on
his claims in an affidavit. (R., p.15.) He asserted that he placed more than 20 calls to
his attorney but they were never returned. (R., pp.15-16.) He stated that he asked his
attorney for a binding Rule 11 agreement but was told that the judge would not allow it.
(R., p.16.) Mr. Leytham averred that he asked his counsel to recuse the district court
judge, but he refused. (R., p.16.) Counsel told him that he and the judge were good
friends. (R., p.16.)
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not contact him before a court
appearance, and that counsel’s law partner, who did not know about his case, appeared
at that hearing. (R., p.16.) When Mr. Leytham finally did speak to his attorney, he was
told that counsel had worked out a “great deal” and that if he pleaded guilty he would
get probation. (R., p.17.) At the entry of plea hearing, Mr. Leytham was told to say that
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there were no promises. (R., p.17.) At sentencing, Mr. Leytham received a sentence of
ten years, with five years fixed. (R., p.17.)
Because Mr. Leytham made factual assertions in his affidavit and requested only
to depose trial counsel regarding his specific claims, he asserts that his motion was not
a generalized search for grievances but a request to question trial counsel regarding his
already alleged grievances.

Further, his post-conviction attorney asserted that he

needed to ask questions of trial counsel to develop the claims. Post-conviction counsel
also asserted, in the response to the State’s motion for summary disposition, that
several of Mr. Leytham’s claims “involve communications or lack therefore with his
counsel in the underlying criminal case, and many of those claims are not addressed
the record.” (R., p.88.) Counsel noted that he requested the ability to depose trial
counsel to address the issues which were not in the record, and that this motion was
denied.

(R., p.88.)

Further, post-conviction counsel asserted that, while the State

claimed that Mr. Leytham’s allegations were not consistent with his answers in the guilty
plea form or at the entry of plea hearing, “Mr. Leytham as indicated that he did not fill
out the Guilty Plea Advisory Form entirely on his own and that he was being advised to
answer the Court’s questions a certain way by his counsel during his guilty plea.” (R.,
p.93.) Counsel acknowledged that these conversations were not in the record, but that
“Mr. Leytham has attempted to conduct discovery during his post-conviction case to
clarify these issues of fact; however, this Court has denied his request.” (R., p.93.)
Counsel argued that a deposition of trial counsel with regard to his social relationship
with the judge would also have been helpful. (R., p.93.) Mr. Leytham’s motion was not
a fishing expedition but rather an attempt to provide evidentiary support for his claims.
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Post-conviction counsel represented to the district court that he “needed” depositions to
get further evidence of the claims and believed affidavits would be insufficient, and
pointed to several instances where the lack of discovery impacted his ability to respond
to the State’s motion for summary dismissal. Mr. Leytham respectfully asserts that the
district court erred by denying his motion to conduct depositions.
II.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Leytham’s Petition For PostConviction Relief
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post–Conviction
Procedure Act, I.C. § 19–4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146
Idaho 720, 724 (2008). However, “[t]he ‘application must contain much more than a
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P.
8(a)(1).’” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138
Idaho 269, 271 (Ct. App. 2002)). The application must be supported by a statement that
“specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based.” Rhoades v.
State, 148 Idaho 247, 249–51 (2009). “The application must present or be accompanied
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to
dismissal.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 (citing I.C. § 19–4903).
“Idaho Code § 19–4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own
initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.” State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). “When
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reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same
standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion.” Citibank (South Dakota),
N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2009) (citing Van v. Portneuf
Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556 (2009)). Likewise, when reviewing a district court's order
of summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same
standard as that applied by the district court. Thus, when reviewing such a dismissal,
“the Court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Yakovac,
145 Idaho at 444.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924–25 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064–65,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693–94 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316 (Ct.App.1995). To
establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State,
114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
Based on his pleadings and affidavits, the district court concluded that
Mr. Leytham’s claims fell into four categories:
1. Trial counsel failed to investigate his medical issues;
2. Trial counsel failed to advise him on all matters necessary to enter an
informed guilty plea;
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3. Trial counsel and Mr. Leytham’s relationship broke down; and
4. Trial counsel failed to inform Mr. Leytham of his rights and responsibilities
under the plea deal prior to entry and misled him as to what the court
would do.
(R., p.109). Mr. Leytham asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether counsel adequately advised him with regard to the entry of his guilty plea,
specifically regarding his sentence.
At the entry of plea hearing, when asked if he had any reason to believe that
Mr. Leytham was under the influence of alcohol or medication, trial counsel responded
that Mr. Leytham was on medication and appeared only “mostly rational.” (9/10/14
Tr., p.12, Ls.2-9.) Counsel believed that Mr Leytham understood what was “going on,”
but then said that “there were just some questions in what he had kind of told me about
his history and things like this.” (9/10/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-22.) Counsel then stated that
his assessment was based on the medications that Mr. Leytham had been taking, and
Mr. Leytham “wasn’t sure how they affected him.” (9/10/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-17.)
The court then asked Mr. Leytham what medication he was taking. He stated
that he had been taking depression pills three times a day for the past forty-five days
but did not know what they were. He also took “Norco” three times a day for pain as
well as Lyrica and Cymbalta for nerve damage and high cholesterol. (9/10/14 Tr., p.14,
L.3 – p.15, L.4.) When asked who filled out the guilty plea form, counsel admitted, “he
[Mr. Leytham] filled out part of it and I filled some of it out.” (9/10/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.6-7.)
Counsel did not remember what part he filled out. (9/10/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-14.)
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The court then questioned Mr. Leytham. While Mr. Leytham told the court that
the medication he was taking did not affect his understanding, Mr. Leytham then said
that the medication made him “more susceptible to Mr. Blender’s suggestions.”
(9/10/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-24.)

Mr. Leytham then said that he misunderstood the

question. (9/10/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6.) With regard to the issue of who filled out the guilty
plea questionnaire, Mr. Leytham stated that Mr. Blender circled about three squares but
did not state which ones. (9/10/14 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-6.) The court then conducted a plea
colloquoy and Mr. Leytham stated that he understood the terms of the plea agreement
and was voluntarily pleading guilty. (9/10/14 Tr., p.25, L.1 – p.34, L.6.)
With regard to the claim that he was misled as to his sentence, the court
determined that the entry of plea transcript indicated that the court advised Mr. Leytham
of the possible punishments and that it was not required to accept counsel’s
recommendations.

(R., p.117.)

The court then held that even assuming that Mr.

Leytham was misled, he could not show prejudice because the record clearly showed
that Mr. Leythan understood that the court was free to impose the sentence that it did .
(R., p.117.)
Mr. Leytham does not dispute that this exchange occurred at the entry of plea
hearing. However, this must be considered in relation to the claims that Mr. Leytham
made in his affidavits. In his first affidavit, Mr. Leytham acknowledged that there was
discussion about whether any promises had been made, and that he specifically asked
his attorney about the “probation he had promised,” and counsel told him “this is not
what the Court is asking about.” (R., p.17.) Thus, Mr. Leytham submitted evidence that
he was informed by counsel not to tell the court about any potential promises. Thus,
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Mr. Leytham’s first affidavit explains why he answered the way he did at the entry of
plea hearing, and it was because of counsel’s advice.

Mr. Leytham’s petition and

affidavit do not dispute that the court questioned him about promises being made. His
affidavit is admissible evidence of why he responded to the court in the way he did,
which is because counsel told him to say there were no promises because probation
was not what the court was asking about. Mr. Leytham asserts that he did raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether he truly understood the sentence imposed because
his affidavit demonstrates that he had concerns when the court discussed the possible
sentence and counsel advised him that this was not actually what the court was talking
about.
Thus, in this circumstance, Mr. Leytham asserts that this claim is not disproven
by the record.

Mr. Leytham never asserted that there was no discussion about

sentencing promises at the entry of plea hearing; he acknowledged that this discussion
occurred but offered evidence in the form of the affidavit as to why he responded the
way he did, and he asserted that counsel was ineffective for advising him to answer the
court in the way that he did. Further, the initial affidavit clearly asserts that Mr. Leytham
did not want to enter a guilty plea but only did after counsel explained that he would get
a “great deal” because he would get probation. (R., pp.16-17.) Thus, Mr. Leytham
submits that the factual allegations in his affidavit create a genuine issue of material fact
as to both deficient performance and prejudice with this claim.
Further, this claim must be considered in relation to the claim, that is supported
by the entry of plea transcript, that Mr. Leytham was taking medication that impacted his
ability to understand the proceedings.

While the district court is correct that
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Mr. Leytham, after lengthy questioning, informed the court that he understood the plea
agreement, the record shows that at the time the guilty plea was entered, counsel had
questions about the effects of Mr. Leytham’s medication on his ability to understand,
that counsel actually filled out part of the guilty plea form, and that Mr. Leytham initially
said that the medication made him susceptible to counsel’s suggestions. The district
court noted, in a discussion of whether Mr. Leytham’s plea was voluntary,2 that the
evidence at the entry of plea hearing demonstrating that Mr. Leytham understood the
consequences of his plea. (R., p.125.) Again, Mr. Leytham does not dispute that he
eventually told the court that he understood the plea consequences. However, this
must be balanced against the allegations in his affidavits, where Mr. Leytham clearly
asserts that he was taking pain medication that affected his ability to understand the
proceedings. And the entry of plea hearing contains statements that support this claim.
Mr. Leytham was taking Hydrocodone, his counsel indicated that he had some concerns
about this medication, counsel filled out part of the guilty plea questionnaire, and
Mr. Leytham initially stated that his medication made his susceptible to suggestion.
Mr. Leytham submits that the record indicates that there is at least a genuine issue of
fact as to what Mr. Leytham understood at the entry of plea hearing, based on what his
counsel told him and the medication he was on.
Mr. Leytham submits that his affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact
with regard to the claim that counsel told him that if he pled guilty he would get

Mr. Leytham acknowledges that his petition does not raise a claim that his plea was
involuntary; rather issues concerning the entry of plea were raised in the context of a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately advise him of the
consequences of the plea.

2
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probation. While Mr. Leytham did acknowledge the court was not bound by sentencing
recommendations or any promises, Mr. Leytham explained in his affidavit why he
responded to the court in the manner he did. In this circumstance, where Mr. Leytham
explained in his affidavit why he answered the court the way he did, he asserts that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Leytham requests that the district court’s order granting summary dismissal
be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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